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The Problem of Bilingualism in Ukraine:  
The Historical and International Context
They make war against Ukraine not for the sake of protecting Russians, but for a 
different reason. Freedom is contagious. The people of Ukraine rebelled against the 
gang of thieves. The fraudsters in the Kremlin cannot sleep at night because they fear 
that this fire may be passed on to Russia. The criminals in the Kremlin must suppress 
freedom in Ukraine because it is a vivid example for the peoples of Russia. They must 
strangle democracy in their neighboring country to protect their stolen billions, to 
preserve their unlawful power, and their own heads and asses from the wrath of the 
people. They have nowhere to run.1 
Viktor Suvorov
The problem of bilingualism in Ukraine used to be a subject of attention for 
linguists, educators and cultural workers and often resulted in never-end-
ing discussions about the advantages for Ukrainians of mastering different 
languages, especially Russian, which is allegedly richer, more developed 
and used more widely in the world. Historians and political scientists 
addressed this issue less frequently, while economists virtually never did 
so. However, this problem, like most problems in any country, actually has 
an important economic component. Those who have denied the Ukrainian 
language’s right to existence have ultimately denied the right of Ukraini-
ans to decide how they want to live, what to build, and what to grow on 
their land. In the late Soviet era, they even questioned the importance for 
Ukrainians of living in their homeland, promoting the well-known slogan 
“My address is not a house or a street, my address is the Soviet Union.” Due 
to lack of education on the part of participants in this dialogue, or indeed 
quite intentionally, the discussion of the role and place of the Ukrainian 
language in the life of the country is still hidden or superseded by a specific 
philological discussion on the best usage of words or correct cases.
1 Suvorov V. Voyna protiv Ukrainy – predsmertnyie sudorogi totalitarnoy imperii. <http://
rufabula.com/news/2014/08/09/suvorov>.
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In reality, the problem of bilingualism, or more precisely, of a single 
language, in essence entails the fundamental right of the speakers to cer-
tain territories, along with the right to manage their land, finances, human 
resources, etc. In the not-so-distant 1970s, a traveler from Ontario visiting 
Montreal could say “Speak white, please” to a French-speaking taxi driver, 
meaning that he should switch from French to English as a primary lan-
guage, relegating the former to a secondary language. While this proba-
bly was not a manifestation of white racism, as both participants of the 
cross-cultural dialogue could be either Caucasian or not, for a native Eng-
lish speaker, this language served to confirm his right to this territory, its 
resources, laws and culture. He was hardly aiming to undermine the lan-
guage of the great Montaigne, Molière or Hugo, nor did he have any prej-
udice against Montesquieu or Voltaire. He most likely did not even know 
anything about them, rather he was demanding respect as a representative 
of the metropolitan center. 
The problem of bilingualism in Belgium, which is well-known in 
Europe and has lasted for centuries, has similar economic origins, with 
some people believing that they are giving up too much to make allow-
ances for their counterparts, while receiving too little economic welfare, 
respect and recognition in return. This can be experienced even now when 
entering the country and speaking to border guards from either language 
group. 
This is the reason that the problem of bilingualism in Ukraine, which 
is traditionally presented as merely a linguistic, cultural and folkloric chal-
lenge or as a problem for writers and artists, is essentially an economic, 
territorial and political issue that is camouflaged in the cheap clothing of 
discussions about correct orthography or word usage. 
Ukrainian, like most literary languages of the European continent, 
took on its modern form in the early nineteenth century, almost at the 
same time as other European languages. A broad and developed litera-
ture in all fields of knowledge has been created in this language. It is used 
in everyday life by 30 to 40 million people in Ukraine and elsewhere in 
the world. Therefore, ongoing talk that this language is artificial, useless, 
provincial and backward should have long become an anachronism or at 
least bad manners in a decent society. However, such theses continue to 
be discussed not only in tabloids, but are even defended at international 
conferences by respectable Russian scholars and their Ukrainian followers.
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Most Russian opponents base their arguments on the assumption that 
the Russian language emerged first and that it is natural, while Ukrainian is 
artificially constructed and useless. However, if we look back further than 
two centuries in terms of the European history of language usage, we can 
see that, prior to that, educated communities on the continent mostly com-
municated in Latin. In the eighteenth century, this was replaced by French, 
which was written and spoken by the educated strata in most European 
capitals. Only in the late eighteenth–early nineteenth centuries were the 
languages of most European people diffused among all strata of educated 
citizens and began to acquire contemporary features. 
In the late eighteenth century, King Friedrich the Great, one of Ger-
many’ founders, who cannot be accused of prejudice against the German 
language or a lack of patriotism, wrote the following in his treatise De la 
littérature Allemande: “I see that this is a semi-barbarian language, which 
has as many dialects as there are provinces in Germany. And each group is 
confident that their patois is the best.”2 He further explained this by refer-
ring to Germany’s impoverishment due to long wars and the insufficient 
development of trade and the bourgeoisie. He also predicted that growth 
in prosperity would allow German culture and science to flourish, and 
that Germans would become civilized and rise to the same level as other 
nations.
Thus, the great German king legitimately drew a connection, first of all, 
between the underdevelopment of the German language relative to French 
and economic factors. However, as Germany created its empire throughout 
the nineteenth century through wars and revolution, it both developed and 
disseminated its language. At that time, Ukraine finally became a part of 
the Russian Empire, which, as all other known empires, aimed to spread its 
political, economic and cultural power throughout all its conquered terri-
tories. The problem of the Russian Empire was that most of the people it 
was trying to unite and subjugate had already developed a historical mem-
ory and legal traditions. They had already achieved a much higher cultural 
level than the majority of Russian speakers. 
As early as the eleventh century, when Christianity (which came to 
Ukraine from Byzantium) was firmly established on Ukrainian terri-
tory, the kings of Central and Western Europe gladly married Ukrainian 
2 Elias, N. Über den Prozess der Zivilisation. Über den Prozess der Zivilisation. Sozio-
genetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen. Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1976, 61. My 
translation.
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princesses. They thereby confirmed a common Christian cultural space, 
extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Dnieper River. The most famous 
of these princesses was Anna, the daughter of the great Kyiv King Yaroslav 
the Wise, who became the wife of the King of France, Henri I. 
The fact that Kyiv was integrated in the cultural space common to the 
countries of its contemporary West is expressively certified, for example, 
by the frescos in the St. Peter and Paul Cathedral in Regensburg, which 
are virtually identical to the frescos of the St. Sophia Cathedral in Kyiv. 
Perhaps they were even painted by the same Byzantine masters. The unde-
served downplaying in today’s Western Europe of the role of Byzantium 
and of its fundamental influence on European culture has prompted many 
Europeans to perceive Ukraine as something different and culturally alien. 
We should have overcome such stereotypes long ago. 
At the same time, in Russia, despite the widespread concept of a “single 
nation,” there always existed an understanding of the cultural peculiarity of 
Ukraine. In order to overcome this, Russian kings even risked the so-called 
“change of faith.” Historians consider this famous church reform, which 
took place in Russia in the mid-seventeenth3 to be an attempt not only to 
modernize the backward Russian Christianity, but also to bring it closer to 
Christianity in Ukraine, in terms of both language and ceremony. Other-
wise, there would be no reason to pursue the policy of seizing Ukrainian 
territories, which has been justified by the unity of the Orthodox faith. 
Other telling evidence of the recognition of the Ukrainian language 
as a separate developed phenomenon is represented by the laws of 1863 
and 1876.4 They prohibited the use of Ukrainian in all spheres. Yet it is 
impossible to prohibit something that does not exist. Thus, the prohibi-
tion of the Ukrainian language became an additional powerful method for 
the economic expansion of the Russian empire. In addition to this, after 
the Hetmanshchyna was finally abolished, non-Ukrainian merchants were 
permitted to trade in Ukrainian cities without paying taxes for 20 years, 
3 Kapterev, N.F., Patriarch Nikon and Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich. Sergiyev Posad, 1912, 
vol. 2, 9.
4 On July 30, 1863, the Minister of the Interior of the Russian Empire, Piotr Valuyev, is-
sued a secret directive to territorial censorship committees, ordering them to halt the 
publication of books written in Ukrainian. According to the directive, the publication 
of religious, educational and enlightening books was prohibited. The operation of 
Valuyev’s circular was secured and expanded by the Ems ukaz of Alexander II of 1876, 
which almost entirely prohibited publication of works in Ukrainian. See further: Al-
eksey Miller. Ukrainskiy vopros v Rossiyskoy imperii. Kyiv, Larus, 2013, 111–133.
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thereby destroying the economic grounds for the existence of a Ukrainian 
bourgeoisie for many years. Nevertheless, despite numerous prohibitions 
and obstacles, the Ukrainian people, who constituted over 90% of the popu-
lation of the territory of contemporary Ukraine, remained devoted to their 
language and culture, and it turned out that the empire was not culturally 
strong enough to replace the language and cultural code of such a huge 
homogeneous mass of the population. This is the reason why, immediately 
after the February 1917 revolution in Russia, a Tsentralna Rada(Central 
Assembly) was created in Ukraine as a representative body for all Ukrain-
ians, followed, later on, by the Ukrainian People’s Republic. 
Unfortunately, Russian attempts at russification were much more suc-
cessful under the Soviet regime.
Thus, after the February revolution occurring in the Russian Empire 
as an outcome of World War I, Ukraine declared its independence and 
began building its statehood. Incidentally, at that time, German, Polish, 
Greek and other national autonomous regions also started to appear in 
Ukraine. Schools were opened, as well as newspapers and administrations 
in the respective languages. However, the Russian-Ukrainian war, which 
started soon after, prevented Ukrainian statehood from coming to fruition. 
In terms of the number of victims and results, this war eclipses all wars 
occurring on the territory of Ukraine from 1914 through 1926. However, 
for political reasons, it is still called a civil war, even in respected academic 
works. In the short period of this war, the Ukrainian language gained the 
recognition of the Bolshevik government in Moscow. It actually became 
the means for Russia’s colonization of Ukraine and its transformation into 
a totalitarian communist republic of the USSR. 
As long as battles between Ukrainian patriots and Russian imperial 
troops lasted, the Ukrainian language was not significantly suppressed by 
the central government in Moscow. The creation of the Ukrainian commu-
nist state, as an equal member of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
and with Ukrainian as the national language, was essentially a compromise 
that Ukrainians agreed to in the war with the Russian communist occu-
piers. However, this compromise did not last for long. Moscow gradually 
concentrated the full scale of military and repressive power in its hands 
and began attacks on the Ukrainian language, not only on the territory of 
Ukraine, but also in the places where many Ukrainians had settled in the 
Russian Federation, such as the Kuban, Povolzhye and the Far East.
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The late 1920s brought mass repressions against Ukrainian native 
speakers, in the form of the Holodomor of 1932–33, which killed millions 
of Ukrainians,5 as well as the extermination of the majority of the higher 
cultural stratum of the Ukrainian nation. The staff of the Ministry of Edu-
cation of Ukraine was almost entirely liquidated (twice). In 1934, after such 
cleansing (i.e. arrests, executions and deportations to GULAGs), only two 
out of 200 persons remained free.6 Most writers, artists, scholars and teach-
ers met the same fate. It is known that 80% of teachers with pre-revolu-
tionary experience were repressed.7 These repressions occurred under the 
slogan of struggling against Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism and involved 
squeezing the Ukrainian language out of all areas of usage within the state.
However, the occurrence of World War II suspended this process of 
Ukraine’s physical transformation into a single-language province of 
Russia.
After the war, the Russian government was forced to spend over ten 
years suppressing the Ukrainian anti-Soviet, or actually anti-Russian, 
movement, which developed mostly in Western Ukraine. Under those con-
ditions, as in the 1920s, the Russian government in Moscow did not dare 
implement total russification. Besides, this was a period of activity for vari-
ous anti-colonial movements in the world. Therefore, it was the wrong time 
to conduct a war against Ukrainians and eliminate the Ukrainian language. 
A short-lived pseudo-ukrainization began during the “thaw” of the 1960s: 
schools teaching in the Ukrainian language were opened in big cities, the 
works of Ukrainian writers began to be published, and new artists and 
cinematographers appeared.
Retrospectively, this “thaw” may be evaluated as a successful special 
operation of the KGB aimed at identifying naïve pro-Ukrainian cultural 
workers, most of whom were successfully cleaned out or intimidated 
later in the 1970s (over 1000 people were repressed8). In addition, in the 
1960s, the Soviet Union was still trying to build its socialist camp and did 
not want to frighten potential “cell-mates” with excessive repressions in 
5 Snyder, T. Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler rand Stalin. Basic Books, 2012.
6 Marochko,V.I., and H. Giotz, Represovani pedagogy Ukrayiny: zhertvy politychnogo 
teroru (1929–1941). Naukovyi svit, Kyiv, 5–21 and 246–55. 
7 Represovani osvityany Cherkashchyny: imennyi pokazhchyk / uklad. V.M. Polyekhina. 
Uman: RVC “Sophia,” 2008, 106. 
8 Rusnachenko, A.M. Natsionalno-vyzvolnyi rukhv Ukrayini: seredyna 1950-kh – pocha-
tok 1990-khrokiv. Kyiv, 1998.
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Ukraine. Nevertheless, after the “Prague Spring” was suppressed in 1968, 
such concerns about the international community lost their urgency. At 
the same time, the Soviet regime also became less bloodthirsty compared 
to Stalinist times. The physical annihilation of the bearers of a language 
and culture was replaced with the policy of “unity of languages – unity of 
cultures,” i.e. the policy of the gradual russification of all national groups 
of the Soviet Union. At that time in Ukraine, the number of schools teach-
ing in the Ukrainian language significantly decreased. Most subjects at 
universities, with the exception of a few universities in Western Ukraine, 
then came to be taught in Russian. In the early 1980s, Russian was officially 
declared the state language of Ukraine. The remnants of the republic’s eco-
nomic and cultural autonomy were destroyed, and decisions regarding all 
economic problems were totally subordinated to the central government 
in Moscow. Incidentally, Ukraine now has such large underground gas 
deposits because from the 1950s to the1970s the imperial center developed 
them in order to support industry in Russia around Moscow.
Thus, like a Canadian demanding “speak white,” a bureaucrat com-
ing to Kyiv or Lviv from Moscow could ask a Ukrainian speaker to speak 
“human” or “normally, not your calf dialect.” This was because he felt him-
self a full-fledged master on the territory controlled by the imperial center 
he represented. 
This was the state of affairs when Ukraine faced the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and practically began to build its statehood from ground 
zero. For many people, even those who knew about the existence of some 
republics or could locate Ukraine on the map of the Soviet Union, their 
conception of this territory was somewhat as follows: somewhere behind 
the Curzon line there was a dull grey mass of “Russians” who hardly differed 
from each other from Murmansk to Baku or from Lviv to Magadan. At first 
sight, especially in the early 1990s, such an understanding was probably 
close to the truth. While today the staff at Turkish resorts is immediately 
able to distinguish Russians from Ukrainians or Kazakhs, such a difference 
was not fully evident for most foreigners at that time. 
After enduring deep sovietization and russification, Ukraine entered 
this new era, divided into two uneven parts. However, it was not divided in 
the way imagined by S. Huntington,9 who was indifferent to Ukraine and 
9 Huntington, S.P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.  Simon 
& Schuster. 2011.
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thus incompetent, or even the version espoused by the more benevolent 
and better-informed Z. Brzezinski.10 Despite the endeavors of Mos-
cow political technologists, who, during the Orange Revolution of 2004, 
attempted to geographically delineate Ukraine into four areas, like dissect-
ing a bull’s carcass, it remained divided not along territorial, but mental 
lines – between the old Soviet nomenklatura and people who were sponta-
neously, yet consciously, anti-Soviet. 
Such a division influenced the further development of the Ukrainian 
state. At the same time, it caused numerous misunderstandings among 
its leaders, as well as those who did not wish Ukraine well and enemies 
from the north-east. This leads to the question: why is it then that these 
divisions, proposed by both the old Soviet and the new Russian political 
technologists, and sanctified by Western masters, finally proved to be 
erroneous?
The issue is that the cultural and mental codes of Ukrainians and 
Russians differ significantly. Today, under the conditions of the present 
Russian invasion of the Ukrainian territory, which is unreservedly sup-
ported by the majority of the Russian Federation’s population, this differ-
ence is becoming particularly evident. 
For a non-biased researcher studying the formation of the Ukrainian 
state for a long time, it is clear that Ukrainians first and foremost strive 
for personal independence from the state, and that they do not respect 
the state as an institution, thereby relying on their own forces. They are 
mostly resourceful and able to self-organize in the case of danger. The main 
demand advanced by rebellious Ukrainians during the Orange Revolution 
and the latest Euromaidan movement was that the government adhere 
to European values, which, according to their beliefs, rest in the rule of 
law, transparent and invariable legislation, understandable taxes and their 
transparent usage, an independent judiciary, and non-corrupt public ser-
vice and law enforcement systems. For over 23 years, these aspirations of 
most Ukrainians for a life they call “European” or “civilized” have been a 
major stumbling block for the post-Soviet nomenklatura in their efforts to 
return the people of Ukraine to the Russian empire of Yeltsin-Putin. 
One of the instruments being used to achieve this goal has been the tra-
ditional policy of russification and attacks on the cultural space of Ukraine. 
10 Brzezinski, Z.The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic Impera-
tives. Basic Books. 1998.
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Thus, during all Ukraine’s years of independence, there has been an ongoing 
and ceaseless struggle to renew the sphere of usage of the Ukrainian language 
within the Ukrainian state. However, this was often ineffective. To resist the 
dissemination of the Ukrainian language, its enemies resorted to all possible 
means and virtually unlimited resources, which were removed from Ukraine’s 
national wealth by an oligarchic nomenklatura controlled by Russia. 
In the late 1980s, during perestroika, when the population received 
most of its information from newspapers, one of the most popular dailies 
was Vechirniy Kyiv. Since its establishment in the 1920s, it had always been 
published in Ukrainian, and only in the late 1980s, during the period of 
intensified russification, did a Russian edition finally appear. When there 
was no longer any pressure from the Communist Party, in a seemingly 
russified Kyiv, the daily circulation of its Ukrainian editions reached half a 
million copies compared to a few dozen thousand for the Russian edition. 
The phenomenon of Vechirniy Kyiv, as well as the anti-Soviet and anti-Rus-
sian student revolution on granite in 1991 and further events vividly prove 
the strong resilience of the Ukrainian language and culture to destruction.
However, in later years, the pro-Russian nomenklatura, which trans-
formed into the pro-Russian bourgeoisie following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, continued to conduct ongoing and purposeful attacks on 
the development of culture in Ukraine. First, with the help of corrupt com-
mercial schemes, they smashed the old print media. Further, television and 
FM radio were totally russified, national cinema was ruined, national pop 
music was marginalized and guest artists from Moscow began to dominate 
all central stages of the country.
While the Ukrainian press and pop culture were being extinguished, 
the country’s humanitarian space became permanently tense with discus-
sions on Ukrainian orthography, the language of instruction at schools, the 
content of textbooks on history and literature, and the law on languages. 
Those debates persisted continually and intensified when it was necessary 
to push a privatization law through Parliament in favor of the oligarchic 
groups in power. At that time, the attention of economically incompetent 
patriots was purposefully concentrated on essentially secondary “language” 
issues, rather than on the primary questions of economic development and 
property redistribution, which were the main interests of Ukrainian oli-
garchs and their Russian partners. 
Although much money and effort have been spent, the history of the 
struggle for the renewed status of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine has 
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resulted in optimistic, rather than pessimistic developments, and has taken 
an unexpected turn. Today, the Ukrainian language is a symbol of Ukraine’s 
European choice, as well as freedom, the rule of law and progress, while, 
due to Moscow’s efforts, Russian has become a symbol of totalitarianism, 
terrorism and backwardness. 
At the same time, the recent events of winter 2014 have proven to 
the whole world a fact that was understood long ago by many Ukrainian 
patriots in the west, in the east, in the north and in the south. Despite all the 
endeavors of the enemies of Ukrainian statehood, language in Ukraine has 
not become an absolute marker of either a pro-European or pro-Russian 
orientation on the part of its speaker. Language has not divided, but instead, 
has united Ukraine. 
Several generations of Russian-speaking citizens have grown up in 
Ukraine to become patriots of their state, irrespective of their language of 
daily communication. Almost all Ukrainians are bilingual, if they want to 
be. It is for this reason that, for Russian-speaking Ukrainians, the official 
status of the Ukrainian language is not an obstacle for one’s personal career, 
but rather a state symbol, much like its flag, national anthem, emblem and 
territory. For this reason, during the parliamentary elections to the Verk-
hovna Rada in 2012, a few dozen thousand Russian-speaking residents of 
Kyiv consciously voted for the Svoboda Party, which was rather dubious in 
its political slogans and actions. They did so because it was the only party 
that managed to clearly come forward to protect the Ukrainian language 
from one of the “language” shenanigans committed in the Parliament by 
the Yanukovych-led majority. 
Hence, the war that Russia has unleashed against Ukraine is not only 
a war concerning the economic assets of Putin’s clique or against Ukraini-
ans’ European choice. This is a war against the alternative “Russian world” 
that has emerged in Ukraine, in which most Russian-speaking citizens 
have consciously stood in favor of an independent Ukrainian state, the 
rule of law, freedom of choice, and free mass media. Unfortunately, these 
European values have not spread amongst the wider population in Russia, 
despite the powerful support rendered to it by the West throughout the 
post-Soviet years.
In Ukraine, these values have gained a foothold and expressively mani-
fest themselves despite all obstacles. Therefore, the further fate of languages 
in a new democratic Ukraine calls for optimism rather than pessimism 
among all their bearers, who are so different, yet so united.
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